The Earned Income Tax Credit generates large average tax refunds for low-income parents, and these refunds are distributed in a narrow time frame. I rely on this plausibly exogenous source of variation in liquidity to investigate the effect of cash-on-hand on unemployment duration. Among EITC-eligible women, unemployment spells beginning just after tax refund receipt last longer than unemployment spells beginning at other times of year. There is no evidence that tax refund receipt is associated with longer unemployment duration for men, or that the longer durations for women are associated with higher-quality subsequent job matches.
1 will generally not receive tax refunds during the first several months of unemployment. I estimate hazard models of re-employment, controlling for the month of entry into unemployment. I find evidence that unemployment spells beginning around the time of tax refund receipt are longer, but only among women. EITC-eligible mothers who enter unemployment in February, and are consequently likely to have cash on hand early in unemployment, have a 16% lower hazard rate of re-employment than similar women who enter unemployment in other months. The effect is stronger among mothers with low levels of education. Despite this longer period of job search, I find no evidence that subsequent jobs are of higher quality. Unemployment spells beginning in February are not associated with greater pre-to post-unemployment wage gains or with other measures of job quality.
Relying on seasonal variation raises the concern that it is something else about February, rather than higher levels of cash-on-hand associated with tax refunds, generating longer unemployment durations. I investigate this concern in two ways. First, I examine variation in the size of EITC payments. Entering unemployment in February has a more negative effect on the re-employment hazard rate for individuals eligible for larger EITC payments, although the precision of this finding varies across specifications. Second, I consider groups who are similar to my primary sample but who receive smaller average tax refunds-parents with income somewhat above the EITC range, low-income individuals without children, and low-income parents observed in earlier years when the EITC was less generous. In groups with smaller average refunds, entering unemployment in February is not associated with longer unemployment duration, although these results are imprecise.
There are relatively few existing estimates of how cash-on-hand affects unemployment duration. Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) produce estimates for Austrian workers and Chetty (2008) provides estimates for U.S. men. The elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to cash-on-hand is an important parameter to estimate because of its implications for the optimal level of UI benefits. Chetty (2008) develops a new formula for optimal UI, which depends solely on the moral hazard and liquidity effects of UI. The moral hazard effect occurs when UI benefits lower an individual's private marginal cost of leisure to a level below the social marginal cost of leisure, and the individual chooses an unemployment duration longer than what is socially optimal. The liquidity effect occurs when borrowing constraints prevent an individual from perfectly smoothing consumption over a period of unemployment. If UI lengthens an unemployment spell by relaxing a borrowing constraint, the longer unemployment duration represents a socially beneficial response. Larger effects of cash-on-hand on unemployment duration indicate larger liquidity effects, implying a higher optimal UI benefit level.
This paper provides new estimates of the effect of cash-on-hand on unemployment duration. It extends the previous literature in two ways. First, it relies on a novel and plausibly exogenous source of transitory variation in cash-on-hand. EITC-eligible individuals who happen to enter unemployment at the time when most EITC payments are disbursed will, on average, have temporarily high levels of liquid assets for reasons unrelated to unobserved individual characteristics. Second, this paper estimates cash-on-hand effects for groups not previously studied in this literature. There are no existing estimates of the unemployment effects of cash-on-hand for women in the United States. The paper's focus on low-income individuals is also new. This is a group of considerable interest to policy makers. Disadvantaged individuals have both higher than average rates of unemployment and lower than average rates of unemployment insurance (UI) receipt during unemployment spells. Even though welfare reform and EITC expansions during the 1990s have increased the labor force participation of low-income mothers, the rate of UI receipt for such women has not increased (Shaefer and Wu 2011) . Only about 20% of the unemployment spells in my sample involve receipt of UI benefits. As there is evidence that UI helps to smooth consumption during unemployment (Gruber 1997, Bloemen and Stancanelli 2005) , the spells considered here are likely associated with large relative declines in consumption and potentially large welfare losses.
My finding of a substantial effect of refund receipt on unemployment duration among lowincome mothers is consistent with a large liquidity effect for this population. If the moral hazard effect of UI for this population is of similar size, or smaller, than for the full set of unemployed individuals, then there would be welfare gains from expanding UI access and generosity for EITC-eligible individuals. On the other hand, if UI benefits have both large liquidity effects and large moral hazard costs among low-income mothers, then the welfare implications of UI expansion are unclear. Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011) show that the moral hazard costs of UI are low when the unemployment rate is high. They compare unemployment rates across geographic areas. One can extrapolate to predict that the moral hazard costs of UI will be lower in high-unemployment labor markets even when divisions between labor markets are constructed on the basis of demographic characteristics rather than geography. However, future research investigating heterogeneity in the moral hazard costs of UI is necessary before drawing conclusions about optimal UI levels for low-income parents.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes theory and previous empirical evidence on the relationship between cash-on-hand and job search behavior. Section 2 documents three facts about the tax refunds of EITC recipients that are critical for my empirical strategy: Tax refunds are large, they arrive in a well-defined and narrow time frame, and the money is spent down quickly. Section 3 outlines my empirical strategy, section 4 describes the SIPP data I use, and section 5 presents results and discussion. Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
In this section I briefly describe a theoretical model that has been used to explain how cash-onhand can affect job search behavior. The key prediction of the model is that an increase in wealth reduces job search effort. Adapting this prediction to the case of tax refunds, search effort is predicted to be lower just after a tax refund is received. In the remainder of this section I review existing empirical evidence on the relationship between cash-on-hand and unemployment, and on other behaviors affected by receipt of infrequent cash payments. Lentz and Tranaes (2005) develop a model in which unemployed individuals jointly choose job search effort and savings.
1 Job search has increasing and convex costs. An unemployed person will choose the level of job search effort that equates the marginal cost of search and the marginal benefit of search, the difference between utility if employed and utility if unemployed. Utility in each state is a function of consumption, which in turn depends on the level of assets held. Individuals with higher levels of assets optimally choose lower levels of job search effort. This model can easily be applied to the case of tax refund receipt. I argue that the concentrated disbursement of EITC-related refunds in February generates temporarily higher values of liquid assets. I test whether search intensity is lower at this time, as measured by lower hazards of exiting from unemployment. The prediction that higher levels of liquid assets are associated with longer unemployment spells has been tested by two earlier papers. Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) take advantage of a sharp discontinuity in eligibility for government-financed severance pay in Austria. Individuals who are just eligible for lump-sum severance payments have an eight to 12% lower re-employment hazard rate than those just barely ineligible. Chetty (2008) uses two datasets to document the role of cash-on-hand in determining unemployment duration. Using SIPP data, he shows that the well-established positive relationship between state UI generosity and unemployment duration is much stronger in households with low cash-on-hand, as measured by net liquid wealth. Using a survey of job losers, he finds that recipients of severance payments have substantially longer average unemployment spells. Chetty acknowledges that variation in cash-on-hand stemming from either receipt of a severance payment or from differences in net liquid wealth is likely endogenous to unobserved individual characteristics, some of which may also affect unemployment duration. For example, individuals with high levels of impatience may accumulate lower net wealth and have also been shown to exert less search effort during an unemployment spell, leading to lower unemployment exit rates (DellaVigna and Paserman 2005) . The transitory refund-related variation that I rely on in this paper is more plausibly exogenous to unobserved individual characteristics.
Examining the responsiveness of job search behavior to changes in cash-on-hand builds on the very large literature testing the permanent income hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, the arrival of an anticipated and transitory lump sum should not change an individual's level of consumption. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) review papers testing this prediction. While the resulting estimates span a wide range, those that make use of tax-related changes in income typically find a substantial consumption response. Souleles (1999) estimates that between 34 1 A more detailed description of the model appears in the appendix, section A.1.
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and 64 cents of each dollar of tax refund received is spent within a quarter.
2 Similarly high estimates of the marginal propensity to consume are found in studies of anticipated one-time tax rebate programs designed to provide fiscal stimulus (Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2006; Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles 2007; Parker et al. 2011) .
Other research has focused more specifically on how low-income families respond to tax refunds. Barrow and McGranahan (2000 ) use 1982 CEX data to investigate seasonal patterns of consumption among low-income individuals. In February, EITC-eligible households spend about three percent more overall and about nine percent more on durable goods than do non-EITC-eligible households. Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) use data from an auto company on the loan applications of low-income individuals with poor credit histories. Among low income filers with two or more dependents, precisely the group receiving large EITC payments, the number of loan applications is twice as high in February as in other months. The number of new car purchases is about three times as high in February as in other months.
Tax Refunds and Cash-on-Hand
The empirical strategy I employ in this paper depends on tax refunds generating substantial and systematic differences in cash-on-hand across different months of the year. In this section I document three key facts about EITC recipients that motivate my empirical strategy. First, I show that EITC recipients receive tax refunds that are quite large relative to their annual income. Second, I show that the refunds of EITC recipients are disbursed in a narrow and well-defined window of time. Third, I argue that EITC recipients spend down their refunds quickly. These facts allow me to characterize the month of February as a time of temporarily high assets relative to other months of the year.
Refunds are Large for EITC Recipients
Filers with earnings in the EITC range receive larger refunds than filers with slightly higher earnings, and low-income filers with children receive substantially larger refunds than do lowincome filers without children. This reflects both a higher propensity to receive a refund at all and a larger dollar value conditional on refund receipt. Figure 1 documents this pattern using data from the 1993-2007 Statistics of Income cross-sectional samples of tax returns.
3 The sample is restricted to non-dependent filers with real adjusted gross income (AGI) between 2 Hsieh (2003) finds that residents of Alaska, who receive large and predictable annual payments from the Alaska Permanent Fund, do not adjust their consumption upon receipt of such payments. In contrast, the same households do display excess sensitivity of consumption upon receiving income tax refunds. Hsieh argues that the greater consumption response out of tax refunds may be due to the smaller size of these payments, and hence the lower utility cost associated with failing to smooth.
3 I am grateful to Laura Kawano of the Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis for providing these tabulations.
$0 and $33,000, measured in real 2007 dollars. This matches the income cutoff I later apply to my SIPP sample. On average, 91% of low-income filers with children receive a refund. In contrast, only 69% of low-income filers without children receive refunds. Averaging across those who receive a refund and those with a balance due, the mean real refund amount for filers with children steadily grows from $1810 in 1993 to $3582 in 2007. These dollar amounts include refundable EITC payments, any other refundable tax credits, and refunds of overwithheld taxes. On average the tax refund amount is equal to 30% of AGI for these filers, equivalent to roughly three and a half months of income. Figure 1 indicates that low-income filers without children receive much smaller refunds in all years. The gap between the average refund for filers with and without children is never less than $1000, and averages $2042 over the 15-year period.
Most EITC Payments are Distributed in February
My empirical strategy assumes not only that low-income filers with children receive refunds that are large relative to their annual incomes, but that these refunds are distributed within a narrow window of time. Evidence of this pattern comes from various Monthly Treasury Statements published by the Treasury Department's Financial Management Service.
4 Figure 2 shows the share of annual refund payments made in each month of the year, averaging across years 1998 through 2007. Pooling refunds paid to filers of any income level, approximately 19% of all refund payments are made in February, 23% in each of March and April, and 17% in May. The pattern of payments is even more concentrated, and shifted somewhat earlier in the year, for returns that include a refundable EITC payment. About 54% of refundable EITC payments are made in February and 25% are made in March.
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The share of refund payments made in February has been increasing over the time period I consider, particularly for EITC returns. February's share of refundable EITC payments has increased from 46% in 1998 to 58% in 2007. Why are EITC-related refunds paid so early in the year? One explanation is that, regardless of income level, filers receiving a refund tend to file earlier than those with a balance due (Slemrod et al. 1997) . A second explanation more specific to the EITC is that e-filing is associated with an earlier refund payment, and EITC returns have very high rates of e-filing. Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2007) show that even as early as 1999, 54% of EITC-claiming returns were e-filed. In contrast, the IRS Oversight Board (2008) shows that the national average e-filing rate in 1999 was around 25%. Figure 2 documents the timing of IRS disbursements. Filers can receive cash a few weeks earlier through the use of a refund anticipation loan (RAL), a financial product similar to a payday loan. Berube et al. (2002) find that 39% of EITC recipients used a RAL in 1999, and that 47% of all EITC dollars were distributed through RALs. They estimate that a filer getting a refund of $1500 would pay about $88 for a RAL. This pricing implies a high effective interest rate, as a RAL reduces the time between filing and refund receipt by only about two weeks for those who otherwise would have used direct deposit and by about six weeks for those who otherwise would have received a check in the mail. The willingness of EITC recipients to take short-term loans at high implicit interest rates might indicate the presence of borrowing constraints, defined as having had requests for credit denied (Jappelli 1990 ). Alternatively, it could be explained by large (and possibly hyperbolic) discount rates.
There are mechanisms through which a refund recipient could spread after-tax income more smoothly across the year. Prior to 2011, an EITC recipient could take up the Advance EITC option, and any filer can adjust the level of taxes withheld from her paycheck. Either of these options involves submitting paperwork to an employer. In practice, these options are very rarely used. Jones (2010a) shows that experimentally providing more information about the Advance EITC, simplifying the application process, and requiring employees to make an active decision to either opt in or opt out of the program increased Advance EITC participation rates by only a very small amount, from 0.3 to 1.2 percentage points. The Advance EITC program was repealed in 2010. Jones (2010b) investigates the extent to which taxpayers adjusted their withholding in response to the 1990s expansions in the EITC. He finds a very precisely estimated zero adjustment, and can rule out that EITC-eligible taxpayers adjust their withholding by more than two cents in response to a $1 increase in the EITC benefit level. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) posit that the marginal propensity to consume out of a large lump sum payment will be lower than the MPC out of an equivalent stream of smaller, periodic payments. If so, receipt of a large tax refund may facilitate saving among low-income households. Indeed, EITC recipients often report a desire to channel a portion of their refunds to savings (Smeeding, Ross, and O'Connor 2000; Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano 2006 ). Yet even with interventions designed to promote savings at tax time, relatively few low-income filers divert part of their refund payment into a savings vehicle.
EITC Recipients Spend Refunds Quickly
6 This evidence on the EITC and savings, along with Souleles' estimate that as much as two-thirds of refunded dollars are spent within three months, suggests that EITC payments are spent down fairly quickly. Thus, an individual who enters unemployment a few months after receiving a tax refund is unlikely to have much of that refund payment still tucked away.
Estimation Strategy
In order to test the hypothesis that unemployment spells beginning shortly after refund receipt are longer than unemployment spells beginning at other times of year, I estimate the hazard of exiting from an unemployment spell into a new job. Specifically, I estimate Cox proportional hazard models of the following form:
where h is the hazard rate and Feb Start is a dummy equal to one if an unemployment spell begins in February. If in fact the extra cash-on-hand from tax refunds reduces job search effort, the coefficient β 1 will be negative. My empirical strategy does not require individual-level information about the amount of a person's tax refund or the exact time at which she receives it. While this information would be useful, it is also endogenous to behavior that is plausibly correlated with determinants of job search effort, including observable variables such as labor income and unobservable variables such as impatience. The exact amount of one's refund depends on income and taxes withheld throughout the year. The timing of refund receipt depends largely on when a person files. This paper's reliance on exogenous group-level seasonal variation in liquid assets generated by tax refunds makes it a useful complement to the Chetty (2008) estimates that rely on individual-7 In a given SIPP interview, respondents report a number of variables at monthly frequency, corresponding to each of the last four months. The last month covered by an interview is considered to be "on the seam." There is a strong tendency for individuals to report the same value for each of the months covered by an interview. Thus, changes within the reference period are smoothed out, changes between interviews are exaggerated, and transitions of all sorts, including out of unemployment, are particularly high for observations on the seam.
8 One such policy is the partially-experience-rated payroll tax states levy on employers to fund UI programs. The degree of experience rating differs across states, but tends to change only slowly within a state over time. Card and Levine (1994) show that imperfect experience rating increases rates of temporary unemployment more during times of low demand than during expansionary times. This is true regardless of whether low demand is attributable to a trough in the business cycle or to seasonal fluctuations within an industry. The implication of this for my analysis is that if February is a generally low-demand month, imperfect experience rating will result in more temporary layoffs at that time. This could result in longer duration for spells beginning in February for reasons unrelated to tax refund receipt.
level cross-sectional variation in liquid wealth.
There is a large literature, reviewed by Krueger and Meyer (2002) , establishing that individuals receiving more generous UI benefits have longer unemployment durations. This motivates the inclusion of WBA i , the weekly UI benefit amount potentially available to an individual based on her state of residence and earnings history.
9 Details on state UI programs come from the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor. When analyzing the behavior of low-income individuals, this measure of benefit generosity is preferable to the maximum weekly benefit amount, often used in the UI literature. While different maximum values do account for a substantial amount of the cross-state heterogeneity in benefit generosity, EITC recipients generally earn too little to qualify for the maximum benefit. Longer durations of unemployment may be desirable if additional search time leads to higherquality eventual matches. Previous research on whether longer unemployment durations are associated with better subsequent jobs has yielded mixed results.
10 I test whether the wage gains associated with re-employment are higher for those who enter unemployment in February. I estimate OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is wage growth, defined as:
The controls used here include an indicator for entering unemployment in February as well as most of the demographic controls included in the hazard models. I do not control for the pre-unemployment wage. 11 Nor do I control for WBA i in these regressions, as an individual's potential benefit amount is highly correlated with his pre-unemployment wage. I also investigate whether beginning an unemployment spell in February is associated with two other proxies for better job quality, being paid a salary rather than being paid on an hourly basis and working full-time rather than part-time. I measure pre-unemployment job characteristics in the last full calendar month preceding entry into unemployment and post-unemployment job characteristics in the first full month following re-employment.
9 I do not control for the potential duration of UI benefit receipt, because there is little variation in this parameter over the time period I consider. Almost all state UI benefit programs cap receipt at 26 weeks. If a state's insured unemployment rate is above some threshold, a resident of that state can claim up to 13 weeks of extended benefits, funded jointly by the federal and state government, after exhausting the stateonly benefits. 10 Evidence from the U.S. shows that more generous UI benefits are not associated with larger wage gains (Addison and Blackburn 2000) but are associated with longer post-unemployment job tenure (Centeno 2004 ). Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) find that Austrian workers who are just eligible for severance pay or extended UI benefits do not have greater wage gains or longer duration on the next job, despite having longer spells of unemployment.
11 Because of potential division bias in my constructed wage measure, I also estimate an alternative specification in which the post-unemployment wage is regressed on the Feb Start indicator, the pre-unemployment wage, and a full set of controls.
SIPP Data
I use data from the 1993, 1996, 2001 , and 2004 panels of the SIPP. Each of these panels is a longitudinal survey that follows respondents for up to three years (1993 and 2001) or four years (1996 and 2004) . Interviews take place every four months. Respondents report weekly labor force status, allowing precise measurement of when a person enters and exits unemployment.
My definition of unemployment spells follows earlier work such as Cullen and Gruber (2000) and Chetty (2008) . An unemployment spell begins with a transition from having a job (either working or temporarily absent without pay) to having no job. A person is considered to remain unemployed until she reports having a job in which she subsequently works for at least four consecutive weeks. I drop unemployment spells that correspond to a temporary layoff and spells in which there is no active search for a new job. To focus on individuals with some demonstrated attachment to the labor force, I restrict the sample to those with at least twelve weeks of work history prior to their first observed unemployment spell. To minimize the number of unemployment spells ending with retirement, I restrict the sample to individuals ages 20 to 64.
12 As is common in this literature, I restrict the sample to unemployment spells lasting no more than one year. My sample includes spells beginning in calendar years 1993 through 2007.
To construct a sample of EITC-eligible individuals, I sum earnings from the three calendar months preceding the month of entry into unemployment. I restrict the sample to those whose combined own and spouse's three-month earnings are greater than zero and less than $8250, measured in real 2007 dollars. Scaled up to annual earnings of $33,000, this roughly corresponds to the top of the EITC-eligible income range for a family with one child in each year of my analysis.
13 I further restrict the sample to parents. Following the IRS definition of an EITCqualifying child, I consider a person to be a parent if, in at least six months out of the preceding year, she was living with one or more of her own children under age 19. I drop individuals with missing values of variables included in the regressions.
14 These restrictions result in a set of 5881 unemployment spells, 2173 experienced by men and 3708 by women. Table A .1 in the appendix shows the number of unemployment spells remaining in the sample after each restriction. It is not uncommon for an individual to experience multiple 12 Chan and Stevens (2001) find that only 70-75% of displaced workers in their 50s return to work within two years, and even fewer displaced workers in their 60s return. My results are robust to lowering the age cutoff to 59, 54, or 49.
13 Scaling up three months of earnings yields a reasonable approximation of annual earnings. For people with 12 months of observed pre-unemployment earnings, and who meet all of my sample criteria other than the earnings restriction, 47% are income-eligible for my sample using actual 12-month earnings or using 3-month earnings multiplied by four. 43% are ineligible for my sample using either income measure, and 6% would be eligible based on 12-month earnings but are ineligible using the scaled up 3-month earnings measure.
14 Most often, state of residence is missing. In the 1996 and 2001 panels, residents of Maine and Vermont are grouped together as are residents of North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. In the 1993 panel, there are three composite state categories. One includes Maine and Vermont, the second includes Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota, and the third includes Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. Other observations are missing imputed hourly wage or net wealth. spells of unemployment meeting the selection criteria.
15 Each of these spells is counted as a separate observation, and standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the person level.
In addition to the sample described above, I pay particular attention to the subsample of individuals who have at most a high school degree.
16 There are two reasons for imposing this additional restriction. First, it narrows the sample to a group most likely to be receiving the EITC. I have used income from the three months just prior to unemployment entry to identify people who are income-eligible for the EITC. There is evidence that earnings begin to decline well in advance of certain job losses, those due to mass layoffs (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993). Thus there may be individuals who appear to be EITC-eligible in a three-month window but who were actually earning too much over a full calendar year to qualify. Educational attainment is highly correlated with permanent income, and other authors have used low educational attainment as a proxy for EITC eligibility (e.g. Eissa and Hoynes 2004 ; some specifications in Eissa and Liebman 1996) . Second, the low-education group has significantly lower net liquid wealth. Women with at most a high school degree have mean wealth of $3679, while women with more than a high school degree have mean wealth of $8399. The infusion of cash-on-hand from a tax refund may have a bigger impact on those with low levels of liquid wealth. Only about 23% of the unemployment spells in my sample involve receipt of UI benefits. This is lower than the aggregate share of unemployed individuals receiving UI, which Nicholson and Needels (2006) estimated to be 36% as of 2004. Some individuals in my sample are ineligible for UI because their pre-unemployment earnings are too low. About 9% of the men in my sample and 17% of the women in my sample earned too little in the three months prior to unemployment to meet their state's UI earnings requirement. Even conditional on being eligible, low-income workers are less likely to take up UI as there is a strong relationship between the level of benefits and take-up (Anderson and Meyer, 1997) .
Not surprisingly, wealth levels are also low for this sample. Net liquid wealth is defined as total wealth minus home equity, business equity, vehicle equity, and unsecured debt. Asset and wealth variables are collected in periodic topical modules. The number of times the wealth topical module is included varies across SIPP panels, from once in the 1993 panel to four times in the 1996 panel. In the case of multiple wealth observations, I use the measure that most closely pre-dates entry into unemployment. If there is no pre-unemployment measure available, I use the earliest observation following entry into unemployment. The infrequent collection of wealth data means that the available values for February unemployment entrants are not necessarily measured in February, and these wealth data are ill-suited for verifying that the liquid assets of EITC recipients are higher in February than in other months. Mean net wealth is not statistically different for individuals entering unemployment at different times, and median net wealth is zero for men and women entering unemployment in any month.
It is possible that individuals entering unemployment in February are leaving short-term jobs associated with the holiday shopping season. If these individuals have generally lower levels of human capital than workers leaving more permanent jobs, they may have a longer average search time before reemployment. Restricting my sample to individuals who have worked for at least twelve weeks prior to their first observed unemployment spell makes it unlikely that holiday-season jobs are affecting the results. As shown in Table 1 , the mean number of weeks worked prior to unemployment is not statistically different for women entering unemployment in February than for women entering unemployment at other times. Among men, unemployment spells beginning in February are preceded by longer working spells than are unemployment spells beginning in other months. It should be noted that the measure of pre-unemployment job tenure is left-censored at the time a person first enters the SIPP.
My estimation strategy relies on the assumption that individuals who enter unemployment in February are similar to individuals who enter unemployment at other times of year, except for the fact that they receive tax refunds at approximately the start of their unemployment spells. The summary statistics in Table 1 provide some reassurance on this point, but it is important to rule out other possible differences between the two groups. It is quite plausible that both seasonal patterns of layoff and average unemployment duration differ across industries. Table 2 compares the pre-unemployment industry of sample members entering unemployment at different times of year.
20 The industry mix is generally similar for women who begin unemployment spells around the time of tax refund receipt and for women who begin unemployment spells at other times. There are some differences for men. Overall, Table 2 suggests that longer unemployment durations among those entering unemployment in February are not a result of February entrants being disproportionately drawn from particular industries. Even so, I control for pre-unemployment industry in my preferred hazard model specification.
To further investigate the possibility that February entrants differ from others, I estimate linear probability models predicting whether an unemployment spell begins in February. The lower the predictive power of these regressions, the more plausible the argument that recent tax refund receipt is responsible for any February effect on unemployment duration. The results of these regressions are shown in columns 3 and 6 of Table 1. 21 Reassuringly, demographics and income-related measures are very poor predictors of February unemployment entrance. However, both the observed length of the pre-unemployment job and an indicator for whether that job tenure is censored are significant predictors of entering unemployment in February. Longer pre-unemployment job tenure is negatively associated with entering unemployment in February, but the longest tenure values (that is, those that are censored) are positively associated with February unemployment entrance. Looking more closely at the distribution of pre-unemployment job tenure shows similar median values (about 27 weeks) for unemployment spells beginning in February and in other months. The difference is in the upper part of the distribution, with a 90th percentile of 79 weeks for February entrants and of 92 weeks for other entrants. While it is difficult to know what is generating this pattern, short-term holiday season jobs are very unlikely to be the explanation. Given the ability of previous job tenure to predict February unemployment entrances and the likely correlation between previous job tenure 20 The corresponding table for the low-education sample, Table A .3, appears in the appendix. 21 In addition to the controls reported in the table, I include a set of year, state, month of entry into the SIPP, and industry fixed effects. Because my sample selection rule requires 12 observed weeks of work prior to an unemployment spell, the month first observed in the SIPP affects the set of months in which any transition to unemployment can satisfy my sample criteria. The results are quite similar if I predict February unemployment entrances using a probit model rather than a linear probability model. and successful job search, I return to this issue in Section 5.3 where I employ a re-weighting technique to remove the effect of compositional differences across February entrants and others.
Before turning to results, I present one final piece of descriptive information. Figure 3 plots the average duration of unemployment spells for women, by month of entry into unemployment. The figure on the left is for the full regression sample and the figure on the right is for the subsample with at most a high school degree. Generally, spells beginning in the early part of the year last longer than spells beginning in the second half of the year. Spells beginning in January or February last longer than spells beginning in any other month of the year. For the full sample, spells beginning in January or February last an average of 19.6 weeks. For the low-education sample, spells beginning in February last an average of 21.3 weeks.
Results

Baseline Results
I first present graphical evidence on job-finding rates. Figure 4 plots Kaplan-Meier survival curves for women and men in the full regression sample.
22 Separate curves are plotted for individuals who begin their spells of unemployment in February (indicated by the more lightly shaded line) and for individuals who enter unemployment in some other month. Among women, those who enter unemployment in February have lower hazards of job-finding. The survival curve for February entrants is always above the survival curve for other entrants, showing that the probability of remaining in unemployment after t weeks is always higher for those who entered unemployment in February. A Cox test rejects equality of the February and othermonth survival curves for women with p = 0.0450. Among men, there is no evidence that the hazard of re-employment differs with the month of entry into unemployment.
23
Coefficients from hazard model estimates for women are shown in Table 3 . 24 In addition to the controls reported in the table, these regressions include year, state, and industry fixed effects. For women there is evidence that spells beginning around the time of refund receipt last longer than spells beginning at other times of year. The Feb Start coefficient of -0.161 in column 1 indicates that the re-employment hazard rate of February entrants is about 16% lower than the re-employment hazard of those entering unemployment at other times of the year. The dollar value of EITC-related refund payments is greatest in February, but non-trivial EITC refund payments are made in January, March, and April. By treating all unemployment 23 I report the Cox test because I am using SIPP sampling weights. With unweighted data, the Kaplan-Meier figures are qualitatively very similar and alternative tests of equality can be used. For women, equality of the unweighted survival curves is rejected with a p-value of 0.0604 when using a log-rank test. For men, equality of the unweighted curves cannot be rejected. The p-value from the log-rank test is 0.6856. 24 The Breslow method is used to deal with ties. The results are similar when the Efron method is used.
entrances in months other than February as part of a control group, assumed to be unaffected by tax refund receipt, I may be biasing my estimates downwards. In column 2, I replace the Feb Start term with an indicator for entering unemployment in either February or March. In this specification, there is no evidence that spells beginning at the time of tax refund receipt last longer than spells beginning at other times. In column 3, I drop spells beginning in January, March, or April. In this case I can be more confident that a comparison of February entrances to other entrances is a comparison of spells beginning with and without recent tax refund receipt. In this specification, the re-employment hazard rate is about 20% lower for February entrants.
The next three columns of Table 3 show results for women who have at most a high school degree. The effect of entering unemployment in February is about twice as large in the loweducation subsample as in the full sample, associated with about a 30% decline in the reemployment hazard rate. When February and March entrances are pooled together, entering unemployment in one of these months is associated with a 13% decline in the re-employment hazard rate. When January, March, and April entrances are dropped, February entrances are associated with a 36% lower re-employment hazard rate. In a specification that includes women of all education levels and interacts the Feb Start term with a low-education indicator, the interaction term is −0.277, with a p-value of 0.057.
25 This indicates that not only are low levels of education associated with longer unemployment spells, but also that they are associated with greater sensitivity of duration to cash-on-hand. Table 4 shows results for men. In contrast to the patterns for women, there is no evidence that men's hazard of exiting from unemployment differs with month of entry. This is not simply because a smaller sample of low-income, low-education men with children generates less precise estimates. The size of the standard errors for men and women is similar, and the point estimates on the Feb Start term for men are quite close to zero. Nor is this because men should be thought of as a control group here, with low rates of EITC eligibility and smaller tax refunds. The overall gender difference in EITC recipiency rates reflects the fact that women are more likely to live with EITC-qualifying children.
26 The population-level pattern of higher female EITC recipiency does not apply here because I have selected a sample of parents living with their children. A specification that pools unemployment spells of men and women and includes an interaction of the Feb Start and female variables confirms that the effect of starting a spell in February is statistically different for men and women with less than a high school degree.
27 It is perhaps not surprising that refund-related cash-on-hand affects the search behavior of women only. Historically married women's labor supply has been more wage-elastic than men's (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999) , although this gap narrowed substantially between 1980 and 2000 (Blau and Kahn 2007; Heim 2007) . Female labor supply responses have been concentrated on the extensive margin, the margin that is most relevant for the unemployed individuals in my sample.
As Table 1 shows, only about a quarter of the female sample is married while three-quarters of the male sample is married. Thus, it may be the case that the observed difference in the behavior of men and women is actually due to different job search behavior of married and unmarried individuals. I investigate this possibility by pooling the sample of men and women and adding an interaction of the Feb Start and Married terms. I find no evidence that the effect of entering unemployment in February varies significantly with marital status. I also split the sample into groups of primary and secondary earners rather than into groups of men and women. I classify all unmarried individuals as primary earners. I classify a married individual as a primary earner if she earns more than her spouse in the three months prior to unemployment entry. I cannot reject the hypothesis that primary and secondary earners respond in the same way to entering unemployment in February.
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I can separately identify the effect of starting an unemployment spell in February and of a particular week of a spell falling within the month of February, given that spells often persist beyond the month in which they start. I have done this by including a full set of calendar month dummies in the regressions. This helps to address concerns about non-tax-related seasonal patterns in re-employment hazard rates. December is a month of low re-employment hazards for women and the last quarter of the year is associated with lower re-employment hazards for men. The February coefficient is not significantly different from zero, for women or for men. This in combination with the Feb Start coefficient suggests that it is tax refund receipt at the beginning of an unemployment spell, rather than at any point during an unemployment spell, that has an important influence on spell length.
It is difficult to find a compelling explanation for the observed empirical pattern that tax refunds seem to affect unemployment duration most if they arrive at the beginning of an unemployment spell.
29 One possibility is that, absent any receipt of tax refunds, job search intensity varies with unemployment duration. Recent evidence including Krueger and Mueller (2010) and Krueger and Mueller (2011) indicates that time per day devoted to job search activities tends to fall over the course of a spell. An infusion of cash-on-hand may have a weak effect towards the end of a spell because there is relatively little active job search to crowd out. The coefficients on other regressors are generally as expected. Among both men and women, unemployment spells are shorter for whites than for non-whites. Being married is associated with longer unemployment duration for women but has no effect on the unemployment duration of men. Being on the seam between interviews is always associated with a dramatically higher 28 The results comparing married and unmarried individuals and comparing primary and secondary earners are shown in Table A .4 in the appendix.
29 It is worth noting that the previous research showing an effect of cash-on-hand on unemployment duration (Chetty 2008; Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007) is based on severance payments, which always arrive at the beginning of unemployment spells. rate of exit from unemployment.
30 In some specifications for men, a more generous weekly benefit amount is associated with a higher hazard of exit from unemployment. This appears to contradict the conventional wisdom that more generous UI benefits result in longer spells of unemployment. However, Levine (1993) points out that if a more generous benefit level reduces the search intensity of UI recipients, it can shorten the unemployment duration of non-recipient searchers by essentially reducing their competition. This sort of spillover could be important in my sample in which only 22% of unemployment spells involve UI receipt. Higher levels of net liquid wealth are associated with longer unemployment durations in the full sample of men, but not in the low-education sample of men or in either sample of women. Table 3 indicates that, among women who are likely EITC-eligible, entering unemployment in February rather than in some other month is associated with a reduction in the re-employment hazard rate. One way to provide context for this result is to compare it to other cases in which a lump-sum payment is made to the newly unemployed. In my sample the typical lump sum provided by a tax refund is equivalent to slightly more than three months of income and is associated with a 16% reduction in re-employment hazard for the full sample of women and a 30% reduction for the low-education sample. Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) find that workers just eligible for a severance payment equal to two months of pre-unemployment salary have about a 12% lower job-finding hazard rate, relative to just-ineligible individuals. Chetty (2008) finds that receipt of a severance payment lowers the job-finding hazard by 23%. He reports survey evidence indicating that the average severance payment is equal to about 2.5 months of wages. It is reassuring that my results are in close alignment with earlier estimates. Another way to interpret the magnitude of my results is to estimate an elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to cash-on-hand. I replace the Feb Start term in Equation 1 with the natural log of cash-on-hand at the beginning of an unemployment spell, ln(A t ). Relying on the approximation that ln(Duration) ≈ ln(1/h) = −ln(h), the duration elasticity is equal to the negative of the hazard model coefficient on the ln(A t ) term. High-frequency (monthly) measures of cash-on-hand are not available in the SIPP. Even if they were, I would want to isolate the exogenous variation in monthly cash-on-hand due to refund receipt, ideally by using Feb Start as an instrument for the cash-on-hand held at the beginning of a spell.
Magnitude of the Estimates
Given the data constraints of the SIPP, I must make assumptions about the "background" level of cash-on-hand unrelated to tax refunds and about the time path of refund-related cashon-hand. I set non-refund-related cash-on-hand equal to the mean real net liquid wealth for women in the regression sample, allowing the value to vary with education. Women with a high school degree or less have mean net wealth of $3679 and women with more education have mean net wealth of $8399. I consider two assumptions about refund-related cash-on-hand. The first is that refunds are spent entirely within the month of February. This is admittedly an extreme assumption, but is useful for putting a bound on the estimated elasticity. Under this assumption, cash-on-hand in February is equal to mean net liquid wealth plus the average refund amount for that particular calendar year.
31 In all other months, cash-on-hand is equal to mean net liquid wealth. Alternatively, I assume that 20% of the refund payment is spent in each month from February to June. 32 Thus cash-on-hand in February is non-refund A t plus the average refund amount, cash-on-hand in March is A t plus 80% of the average refund, etc. The resulting elasticity estimates are shown in Table 5 . Assuming that refunds are spent entirely within the month of February, the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to cash-on-hand at the start of a spell is estimated to be 0.37 for the full sample of women and 0.51 for the low-education sample. The elasticity estimates are about 70% as large under the assumption that refunds are spent down gradually over a 5-month period.
33 A response of this magnitude is broadly in line with existing evidence on how UI benefits influence unemployment duration. A standard estimate of the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to UI benefit levels is 0.8 (e.g. Meyer 1990 ). Chetty (2008) estimates that 60% of this elasticity is due to the liquidity effect. Together, these estimates imply an elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to cash-on-hand of 0.48, qualitatively similar to the values in Table 5 .
Robustness Checks
In this section I test the robustness of my main results to a variety of alternative assumptions and specifications. First I estimate an alternative model which includes a set of 11 startingmonth dummies, one for beginning an unemployment spell in each month of the year. (July is the omitted month.) This specification permits the possibility of greater seasonal variation in unemployment duration than may be apparent in the baseline model, where unemployment entrances in all months of low refund receipt are grouped together. The coefficients on the starting-month dummies and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals for women are plotted in Figure 5 . 34 Sample sizes in any given month are small, and the results are not very precise.
For the full sample, none of the starting-month coefficients is statistically different from zero.
31 Annual average refunds amounts are shown in Figure 1 . 32 This pattern is chosen to match Souleles's estimate that roughly 60% of refund dollars are spent within one quarter of receipt. It is also consistent with survey evidence from Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano (2006) . They conducted follow-up surveys three to five months after clients of a volunteer tax preparation site received refunds. On average, 20% of the refund amount was still being saved.
33 It is possible that individuals follow a simple rule-of-thumb dictating that they stay unemployed until they have spent down their tax refunds, while the relationship between other liquid assets and job search is described by a different model. This might happen if individuals use different mental accounts for liquid assets delivered in the form of a tax refund and for other liquid assets held at the time of entry into unemployment. If so, then the "liquidity effect" I estimate here, relying on seasonal patterns of tax refund payments, may differ from the more general liquidity effect that would be associated with increasing UI payments to low-income parents.
34 In similar specifications for men, none of the starting-month coefficients is statistically different from zero.
In the low-education sample, the job-finding hazard is lower for spells that begin in February than for spells beginning in any other month.
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If the February effect on unemployment duration is driven by tax refund receipt, the effect should be larger for individuals receiving larger refunds. It is difficult to estimate the non-EITC portion of a person's refund, as it depends on idiosyncratic and unobserved withholding decisions. I use information on number of children and earnings to predict the size of EITC payments, and assume that a larger EITC payment is correlated with a larger refund. I then interact the Feb Start dummy and the predicted EITC amount. I include individuals with and without children, to increase the variation in predicted EITC amount. Results for low-education women are shown in Table 6 .
36 Column 1 shows that entering unemployment in February has an insignificant effect on duration among women ineligible for the EITC, and that the larger the EITC value, the more negative the effect of a February entrance on the re-employment hazard. In column 2 I replace the dollar amount with the natural log of the EITC value. Again larger EITC values are associated with lower re-employment hazards, although the interaction term is not significant at conventional levels. The p-value on this interaction term is 0.127.
Column 3 of Table 6 shows the results of a specification with a full set of starting-month dummies and the interaction of each of these with the predicted EITC amount. The coefficient on the February interaction term is -0.139, significant at the 5% level. This is larger, in absolute value, than the coefficient on any other month interaction, although larger EITC payments for January and April entrants are also associated with lower re-employment hazards. Column 4 shows results relying on variation in EITC generosity for February entrants only. An additional $1000 of predicted EITC is associated with a 16.6% reduction in the re-employment hazard, with a p-value of 0.117. This estimate comes from a sample of only 299 unemployment spells, and thus should be treated with caution. Table 7 shows several other specifications. I have used a different method of identifying parents in the 1993 panel than in later panels.
37 Row A of Table 7 shows that applying the 1993 parent identification method to all panels has virtually no effect on the results. To mirror 35 I have also tried estimating 12 different regressions for each group, comparing spells starting in a single month t to spells starting in the combined set of the 11 months other than t. The pattern of results is similar to Figure 5 , with smaller confidence intervals. For women in both the full and low-education samples, entering unemployment in February has a significant negative effect on the re-employment hazard. In the low-education sample, entering unemployment in November has a significant positive effect on the re-employment hazard which is robust to a number of alternative specifications. I suspect that the November effect in the low-education sample is spurious. If holiday-season jobs accounted for the high re-employment hazards of these November entrants, there should be a similar positive Nov Start coefficient for other groups, such as low-income childless women and mothers with higher incomes. This is not the case.
36 Corresponding results for the full sample are in Table A .5 in the appendix. the tax code's definition of an EITC-qualifying child, my baseline definition of a parent requires living with a child for at least six months before unemployment, or for all observed months for those with fewer than six months observed prior to unemployment entry. In row B I count a person as a parent if he or she was living with an under-19 child at the time of unemployment entry, ignoring household composition in the previous five months. This change has little effect on the Feb Start coefficient. In the baseline I use earnings from the three months prior to unemployment entry to identify households in the EITC-eligible range. If instead I use 12 months of earnings, my sample size falls by about 25% but the Feb Start coefficient changes little. Results are in row C.
I check the robustness of my results to including a variety of fixed effects. Row D of Table  7 includes year-by-state fixed effects, row E includes state-by-month fixed effects, and row F includes industry-by-month fixed effects. Only the inclusion of year-by-state fixed effects has a meaningful impact on the results. In this specification, the effect of a February entrance is no longer significant in the full sample and falls by more than a quarter in the low-education sample. All of the results to this point have used the SIPP sampling weight from the first month of a given unemployment spell. Row G shows that unweighted results are quite similar.
While Table 1 shows that the groups entering unemployment in February and in other months are similar along a number of dimensions, there are some compositional differences across groups, particularly in pre-unemployment job tenure. To remove any effect of these compositional differences, I use a re-weighting approach as described by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) . The re-weighting factors are constructed to replace the marginal distribution of X conditional on entrance at a particular time with the overall distribution of X.
38 As
Row H of Table 7 shows, this re-weighting changes the results for the full sample but has little effect on results for the low-education sample. In the full sample, entering unemployment around the time of tax refund receipt is no longer associated with a significantly lower reemployment hazard. In the low-education subsample, February unemployment entrances are again associated with a 30% lower re-employment hazard.
Falsification Tests
It is possible that unemployment spells beginning in February are longer than unemployment spells beginning at other times of year for reasons unrelated to tax refund receipt. While it is difficult to rule this out conclusively, the absence of a significant February effect for groups of individuals unlikely to be receiving large refunds in February makes such a story less plausible. I consider three groups who are similar to my primary sample in many ways but who receive smaller average refunds. First I consider individuals who appear to have no EITC-qualifying 38 Specifically, I estimate probit models and then generate predictions of the probability of a February entrance conditional on X. I define a re-weighting factor of p p i for February entrants and of 1 − p 1 − p i for other entrants.
children, but who otherwise meet my sample criteria. There is no evidence that a February entrance affects unemployment duration for these groups. In most cases I cannot reject equality of the February effect for the treatment and control groups. Overall, the results from comparisons of high-refund and low-refund groups are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that tax refunds lengthen unemployment duration, but they are imprecise.
Effects on Job Quality
Given that beginning an unemployment spell around the time of tax refund receipt is associated with longer unemployment spells for low-income women with children, I next investigate whether these longer searches result in better eventual search outcomes. Sample sizes are smaller here because not all spells in my sample end with re-employment, and because measures of job quality are missing for some employed respondents. Results of wage growth regressions for women are shown in column 1 of Table 9 . There is no evidence that unemployment spells beginning in February are associated with greater wage growth. The same is true in column 2, where I use an alternative specification motivated by possible division bias in my wage growth estimate. In column 2, I regress the log of postunemployment wage on a vector of controls, including the log of pre-unemployment wage. In column 3 I use an indicator for whether a job pays an hourly wage as a measure of lower-quality employment. In this specification I also control for whether an individual's pre-unemployment job paid an hourly wage. There is substantial persistence in having employment compensated on an hourly basis. Entering an unemployment spell in February has no significant effect on whether one's post-unemployment compensation is hourly. In column 4 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the usual number of hours worked per week in the postunemployment job is greater than 40. Using this as a proxy for job quality is motivated by the fact that full-time jobs typically offer higher hourly pay than part-time jobs (Hirsch 2005) , and that full-time jobs are more likely to provide health insurance benefits (Farber and Levy 2000) . Unemployment spells beginning in February are no more likely to end with a full-time job than are unemployment spells beginning in other months of the year.
The absence of any positive effect on job quality measures is not particularly surprising, for three reasons. First, the extra search time associated with a February entrance into unemployment is only about four weeks. Second, this group of individuals with at most a high school degree faces limited labor market opportunities. Finally, other researchers have found little effect of longer unemployment spells on wage gains, even for samples drawn from a broader range of education levels (Addison and Blackburn 2000; Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007) .
Conclusion
Low-income filers with children receive large tax refunds in a concentrated period of time. On average, the tax refunds of EITC-eligible parents are equivalent to about three and a half months of income. More than half of all refundable EITC payments are distributed in the month of February. These patterns generate plausibly exogenous variation in cash-on-hand that can be used to estimate the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to cash-on-hand. I find that the additional cash-on-hand from a tax refund lengthens unemployment spells of lowincome mothers. Among these women, unemployment spells beginning in February have a 16% lower hazard of re-employment. The effect is more pronounced among women with low levels of education. Among those with at most a high school degree, entering unemployment in February is associated with about a 30% reduction in the re-employment hazard rate, corresponding to about four weeks of additional time in unemployment.
Tax refund payments provide liquidity but, unlike UI benefits, do not change the return to a marginal unit of work. Although a filer's EITC payment is a function of her annual earnings, the amount is predetermined by the time the tax refund arrives. Thus, in the framework developed by Chetty (2008) , tax refund payments lengthen unemployment spells not through moral hazard but by relaxing liquidity constraints. Given the evidence in this paper of a strong relationship between cash-on-hand and unemployment duration for low-income women with children, it is likely that making UI benefits more generous for this group would increase unemployment duration by further easing credit constraints. The figure plots the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for variables indicating the month of entry into unemployment, from a hazard model including demographic controls and a set of year, state, industry, current calendar year and current calendar month dummies. July is the omitted month. The left-hand figure is for all women in the sample while the right-hand figure is restricted to women with a high school degree or less. Stars indicate a significant difference across the preceding two columns. Those with a missing value for preunemployment industry are placed in the other industry category. The table reports coefficients from hazard models. Standard errors, clustered at the person level, are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. The table reports coefficients from hazard models. Standard errors, clustered at the person level, are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. The table reports coefficients from hazard models. Standard errors, clustered at the person level, are in parentheses. The value of the EITC is calculated using information on the number of children an individual has and the level of her own plus her spouse's earnings. The value of the EITC is measured in thousands of real 2007 dollars. The specification in column 3 includes a full set of Month Start · EITC Value interactions, with July as the omitted month. In all columns, the sample is restricted to women with a high school degree or less. The table reports coefficients from hazard models. Standard errors, clustered at the person level, are in parentheses. All specifications include demographic controls and a full set of year, month, state, and industry fixed effects. Panel A estimates models for control groups only. Panel B estimates difference-in-difference models for combined treatment and control groups, interacting the F ebStart variable with a treatment indicator. The control group in columns 1 and 4 is low-education individuals who did not have an own child living in their household for at least six months prior to unemployment entry, but who otherwise meet the baseline sample definition. The control group in columns 2 and 5 is low-education individuals whose combined real own and spouse's earnings in the three months prior to unemployment were between $8250 and $16500. The control group in columns 3 and 6 is low-education parents who satisfy the criteria for inclusion in the main sample, but who are observed in the 1984, 1985, or 1986 SIPP. 
A Appendix
A.1 A Model of Cash-on-Hand and Job Search
In the Lentz and Tranaes (2005) model, individuals move between employment and unemployment, jointly choosing job search effort and savings. This model has been adapted and used by Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) and Chetty (2008) in their studies of cash-on-hand and labor market behavior. I borrow liberally from these papers in the following description.
Consider an individual who becomes unemployed at time t = 0. She chooses job search intensity s t , normalized so that s t is equal to the probability of finding a job in period t. Searching has a cost of ψ(s t ), assumed to be increasing and convex. If the individual finds a job, she starts work immediately and earns an exogenously fixed wage of w in that period. If employed in period t, her consumption is c e t . If she does not find a job, she receives a benefit of b from the unemployment insurance system and her consumption is c u t . Her flow utility in period t is u(c t )−ψ(s t ). This individual has a subjective discount rate of δ and faces an interest rate of r. Let A t denote the value of assets held at the beginning of period t.
If an individual has a job at time t, her value function conditional on having assets A t at the beginning of the period is
where L is a lower bound on assets, consistent with facing a borrowing constraint. If a person has not found a job as of time t, her value function is
Here J t is the expected value of entering period t without a job, defined as
A person who is unemployed chooses search effort to maximize her expected utility. This yields the first order condition
Intuitively, a person exerts effort just until the marginal cost of search is equal to the marginal benefit of search, the difference between utility in the employed and unemployed states. This first order condition can be differentiated to show the effect of changes in wealth on search effort. Doing so yields ∂s * t
.
Lentz and Tranaes show that, with the assumption that utility is additively separable in consumption and search effort, the numerator of this term will be negative. Thus, search effort falls as wealth increases.
Relaxing the assumption of a fixed wage w does not change the prediction that optimal search effort falls as cash-on-hand increases. Suppose instead that with probability s t an individual is offered a wage of w ∼ w m + F (w). This wage offer is accepted if it is above the individual's reservation wage of R t . In this case the expected value of entering period t without a job is given by The greater the probability that a given wage draw is above the reservation wage, the stronger (in absolute value) the relationship between cash-on-hand and optimal search effort. The sample is restricted to individuals with at most a high school degree. For women, a Cox test rejects equality of the survival curves with a p-value of 0.0091. For men, a Cox test cannot reject equality of the survival curves. The p-value is 0.7328. This table reports the number of unemployment spells remaining in the sample after each restriction is imposed. The second-to-last row is the baseline sample. 
A.2 Additional Tables and Figures
